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Abstract We develop and extend a line of recent works on the design of
mechanisms for heterogeneous tasks assignment problem in ’crowdsourcing’.
The budgeted market we consider consists of multiple task requesters and mul-
tiple IoT devices as task executers. In this, each task requester is endowed with
a single distinct task along with the publicly known budget. Also, each IoT
device has valuations as the cost for executing the tasks and quality, which are
private. Given such scenario, the objective is to select a subset of IoT devices
for each task, such that the total payment made is within the allotted quota
of the budget while attaining a threshold quality. For the purpose of deter-
mining the unknown quality of the IoT devices we have utilized the concept of
peer grading. In this paper, we have carefully crafted a truthful budget feasible
mechanism for the problem under investigation that also allows us to have
the true information about the quality of the IoT devices. Further, we have
extended the set-up considering the case where the tasks are divisible in na-
ture and the IoT devices are working collaboratively, instead of, a single entity
for executing each task. We have designed the budget feasible mechanisms for
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the extended versions. The simulations are performed in order to measure the
efficacy of our proposed mechanism.
Keywords Crowdsourcing · IoT devices · Truthful · Budget feasible · Peer
grading · Shapley value
1 Introduction
Over the past decades, most of the works in crowdsourcing Howe (2006);
Slivkins and Vaughan (2014) mainly circumvent around tackling one of the
major challenges of how to motivate the crowd workers to participate in the
system? One solution that has been appreciated a lot in this direction is, to in-
centivize the task executers. This gave rise to several other open questions: 1)
Which task executers to be hired? 2) How the task requester(s) can be aware
about the quality of the task executers (or crowd workers)? 3) What amount
is to be paid to the task executers for their services, so that they are not dis-
hearten and are motivated to participate in future in similar type of systems?
Answering to the above raised questions, substantial amount of works have
been done in these directions Bhat et al. (2016); Gao et al. (2015b); Goel
et al. (2014); Jain et al. (2018, 2016); Luo et al. (2016); Chatzimilioudis et al.
(2012). In this paper, we have investigated the set-up motivated by the set-ups
discussed in Goel et al. (2014); Assadi et al. (2015). In our setup: 1) the task
executers are the IoT devices instead of human agents, and 2) in order to be
aware about the quality of IoT devices, we have utilized the technique of peer
grading. It is different from the general practice for identifying the quality of
the human agents Jain et al. (2018); Bhat et al. (2016). It is to be noted that,
till date, in the crowdsourcing literature this tedious job of determining the
quality of the crowd workers is mostly done by the platform or in some cases
by the task requesters. This leads to an extra burden on the platform or the
task requesters. Also, this scenario makes the process of quality determina-
tion centralized. In our peer grading approach, we use to distribute the task
executed by the IoT devices to their peers (other IoT devices), for grading
purpose. Based on the peers report, the quality IoT devices are selected.
The detailing of our proposed model is depicted in Fig. 1. In our model,
we have multiple task requesters and multiple IoT devices (as task executers).
Each task requester is endowed with a single task and the maximum amount
he/she (henceforth he) can pay termed as budget (or capital). Each IoT device
has an independent private cost for each task, that they will charge for execut-
ing the task. It is to be noted that, the participating IoT devices are intelligent
and rational. Due to their rational behaviour they will try to strategize the
system. By strategizing we mean that these devices can manipulate their pri-
vate information(s) in order to gain. Given this set-up, our goal is to select the
subset of IoT devices for each task such that the total payment made to the
IoT devices is within the allotted quota of budget for the task while attain-
ing a threshold quality. Following the general work flow of the crowdsourcing,
firstly, each task requester submits the endowed task and the publicly known
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budget to the platform. On receiving the tasks and the endowed capital for
the respective task from the task requesters, the platform publishes the tasks






































in k time slots
IoT Devices (as Task Executers)
Platform
Fig. 1: Pictorial representation of proposed model
Now, each IoT device presents on the other side of the market, opts for
the subset of tasks of their interest for execution. They report their interest to
the platform along with the amount they will charge for executing each task.
Based on their reported interests, the platform assigns the tasks to the IoT
devices. In our set-up, it is assumed that each IoT device will execute all of its
tasks for which it has shown interest and each IoT device executes single task
at a time. Now, the immediate question is: How to preserve the assumptions
made for the problem under investigation? One solution that could be thought
of, is to place each of the tasks of an IoT device on which it has shown inter-
est into different time slots (here, time slots could be thought of as morning,
afternoon, and evening for a day) that will help in keeping our assumptions
alive.
Say, for example an IoT device has shown its interest over 3 tasks. In such
case, one task will be scheduled in the morning, another task in the afternoon,
and the last one will be scheduled in the evening.
After the distribution of tasks into different time slots, the IoT devices
executes the assigned task(s) and submit to the platform as depicted in Fig. 1.
Now, the next challenge that comes into the pocket of the platform is to deter-
mine the quality of the IoT devices. For this purpose, the idea of peer grading
Alfaro et al. (2016); Roughgarden (2016) is utilized in our set-up. It is to be
noted that, in each time slot and for each task, the process of peer grading is
carried out. The process continues until each IoT device is not graded by its
peers. Finally, the peer grading process returns a set of quality IoT devices for
each task. Now, given the set of quality IoT devices for each task, we have to
select a subset of IoT devices in a way that the total payment made is within
the allotted quota of budget.
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In this paper, we have carefully crafted a truthful budget feasible mechanism
for the task allocation problem (TUBE-TAP) motivated by Singer (2010);
Singh et al. (2018b), that also allow us to have the true information about the
quality of the IoT devices1. Further in this line, we have extended our rudi-
mentary model by injecting the constraint that the tasks endowed by the task
requesters are divisible in nature. It is to be noted that, the solution approach
for the later version of the models differs from the rudimentary model only in
terms of mechanism design part. In this context, non-truthful budget feasible
mechanisms are proposed motivated by Maschler et al. (2013); Shapley (1953);
Singer (2010) to cater the need of the problems to some extent.
The main contributions of this paper are:
- We have investigated the heterogeneous task assignment problem in IoT
based crowdsourcing through the lens of mechanism design.
- We have developed a truthful budget feasible mechanism and the non-
truthful budget feasible mechanisms for the rudimentary version and the
more realistic versions of the problem respectively.
- We prove that TUBE-TAP is truthful and budget feasible through simula-
tion and theoretical analysis.
- The simulations are done for comparing the TUBE-TAP with a carefully
crafted benchmark mechanism.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the prior
works explored in the direction of crowdsourcing are discussed. In section 3,
we describe our proposed system model in detailed manner. We then present
our proposed mechanism namely TUBE-TAP in section 4. Further analysis of
TUBE-TAP is carried out in section 5. In section 6 the more general setting
with divisible task is discussed in detailed manner. Further enhancement of the
model is done in section 7. In section 8 the experimental results are presented
and discussed. In section 9 the paper is concluded and the future directions
are coined.
2 Related Works
In order to get the detailed overview of the crowdsourcing we recommend
readers to go through Howe (2006); Yuen et al. (2011); Slivkins and Vaughan
(2014); Mazlan et al. (2018); Daniel et al. (2018). In past there have been
an extensive body of works discussing about the major challenges in crowd-
sourcing Slivkins and Vaughan (2014) and in some cases providing the solution
approach Bhat et al. (2016); Jain et al. (2016); Luo et al. (2016). The two major
challenges in crowdsourcing that have dragged the interest of large community
are: 1) How to motivate large group of common people to participate in this
system, as they are rational. 2) How to verify that the executed tasks supplied
1 It is to be noted, our proposed system is applicable equally to the system where there
are human agents instead of IoT devices in the role of task executers.
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by the agents are upto the mark. Answering to the issue raised in point 1
several schemes are proposed that incentivize the participating agents in some
sense Luo et al. (2016); Goel et al. (2014); Duan et al. (2017); Li et al. (2018);
Reddy et al. (2010); Lee and Hoh (2010b,a). Following works in Reddy et al.
(2010), a better auction models were proposed in Zhao et al. (2014); Gao et al.
(2015a); Feng et al. (2014). In Goel et al. (2014), an effort has been made to
design a truthful budget feasible mechanism for the set-up consisting of single
task requester endowed with multiple tasks and multiple task executers, in an
online environment. The task executers along with the private cost have dif-
ferent skills based on which they show their interest to perform certain subset
of tasks. The goal is to select the subset of task executers in such a way that
the total payment made to the task executers does not exceed the budget.
In the similar line, the work by Xu et al. (2017) is carried out where, the
set-up consists of multiple tasks with deadlines that are to be executed by
the pool of workers that arrive online. Each of the workers has the preferred
set of tasks that he/she can perform and based on that the task is assigned
to the workers before its deadline. The goal is to design an online-assignment
policy such that the total expected profit is maximized subject to budget and
deadline constraints. In Tinati et al. (2017) discussion regarding several open
research questions associated with IoT is made. Also, the emphasis is made on
how the crowdsourcing and the IoT could be meld together to resolve several
challenging aspects associated with the IoT.
However, the literature covered till now, in this paper, does not consider
the quality of the data supplied or more formally, the quality of the crowd
workers. Some quality adaptive schemes are discussed in Jain et al. (2018);
Gao et al. (2015b); Gong and Shroff (2018). In Kobayashi et al. (2018) the
two stage scheme is used for improving the quality of the crowd workers termed
as self-correction. In the first stage, the workers execute the supplied tasks and
submit the executed tasks. In the second stage, the workers review the exe-
cuted task by other workers, may update their result accordingly, and resubmit
the improved version of the executed task.
3 System Model and Problem Formulation
In this section, we present the formal statement of our problem. We consider n
task requesters R = {R1,R2, . . . ,Rn} each carrying a single distinct task. The
set of tasks is represented as T = {T1,T2, . . . ,Tn}; where Ti is the ith task
held by Ri task requester. Also, along with a task, each task requester Ri ∈ R
has an upper bound on the amount he/she (henceforth he) can pay for getting
his task executed, known as budget represented as Bi. The budget vector for
all the task requesters is given as B = {B1,B2, . . . ,Bn}. Each of the task
requester submits the endowed task along with their publicly known budget
to the platform. The platform projects these tasks to the IoT devices present on
the other side of the market. In our set-up, we have m IoT devices represented
by the set E = {E1,E2, . . . ,Em}. It is considered that m  n. Afterwards,
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each IoT device shows its interest over the set of tasks for execution purpose
to the platform along with the maximum value it can charge for executing
each task. Utilizing the submitted information by the IoT devices, we can
have the set of IoT devices that are interested to execute the task Tj and
is given as Ij = {E1,E2, . . . ,Ekj}; where kj is the number of IoT devices
associated with task Tj . The set I = {I1, I2, . . . , In} represents the associated
set of IoT devices for all the n tasks. The maximum value an IoT device Ei
will charge for executing a task Tj is given as vji called the valuation. The
valuations of the IoT devices are private in nature. It is to be noted that
the IoT devices are strategic in nature. By strategic, we mean that the IoT
devices can misreport their private valuation in order to gain. So, it is better
to represent the bid value of each IoT device Ei for executing the task Tj




i represents the fact that the IoT device Ei report its private
valuation bji for the task Tj in a truthful manner. The bid vector for each task
Tj is given as bj = {bj1, bj2, . . . , bjkj}. The set b = {b1, b2, . . . , bn} represents
the set of bid vectors of the IoT devices for all the tasks. Based on the set
I, a non-conflict graph G(V, E) is constructed; where V is the set of vertices
representing the tasks. An edge (i, j) ∈ E between the tasks i and j represents
the fact that the pair (i, j) have at least one IoT device that is associated
to both the tasks. Once the graph is constructed, next target is to place the
tasks along with their respective IoT devices to different time slots so as to
preserve the assumptions made. The set of time slots to which all the tasks
are placed in, is given as τ = {1, 2, . . . , κ}; where κ is the number of time slots
available. In peer grading phase, each IoT device Ei provides a rank list over
the subset of IoT devices associated with task Tj denoted by ji , where E`
ji Ek means that the IoT device Ei ranks E` above Ek. For each task Tj ,
this peer grading process will result in the quality IoT devices. Now, the next
target is to select the subset of IoT devices from the quality IoT devices for
each task and decide their payment. The allocation vector for all the tasks
is given as A = {A1,A2, . . . ,An}; where Ai contains the IoT devices selected
for task Ti. Similarly, the payment vector of all the IoT devices for n tasks is
given as P = {P 1,P 2, . . . ,P n}. Here, P j is the payment vector of IoT devices
associated with task Tj and is given as P j = {P j1, . . . ,P jkj}; where P
j
i is the
payment received by IoT device Ei for executing task Tj . The utility achieved
by any ith IoT device for each task Tj could be defined as the payment it
received for executing task Tj minus the valuation of an IoT device for task
Tj i.e. uji = P
j
i − vji , if Ei is considered for task Tj ; otherwise 0.
Definition 1 (Incentive Compatible (IC) or Truthful Nisan et al.
(2007)) A mechanism is said to be truthful, if reporting the true valuation
by any agent i will maximize its utility irrespective of the valuations of other
agents. In our case, for any arbitrary IoT device Ei for task Tj the utility
relation is uji = P
j
i − vji ≥ P ji − bji = ûji ; where uji is the utility when Ei
reports true value and ûji is the utility when reporting the bid other than the
true value bji 6= vji .
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Definition 2 (Individual Rationality (IR) Nisan et al. (2007)) A mech-
anism is said to be individually rational if every agent i results in non-negative
utility. More formally in our case, uji ≥ 0 when participating in the system.
Definition 3 (Budget Feasibility (BF) Singer (2010)) A mechanism is
said to be budget feasible if the total payment made to the agents are within
total budget. In our case, fix a task Tj we have,
kj∑
i=1
P ji ≤ Bj .
4 Proposed Mechanism: TUBE-TAP
In this section, we have proposed a truthful mechanism namely TUBE-TAP.
The main components of the TUBE-TAP are: Time slot allocation heuristic,
Quality determination rule, and Allocation and payment rule.
4.1 Time Slot Allocation Heuristic
The underlying idea behind proposing Time slot allocation heuristic motivated
by2 is to distribute the tasks into different time slots, so that: (a) the IoT
devices gets the privilege to execute all the tasks for which they have shown
their interest; (b) each IoT device executes a single task at a time.
4.1.1 Outline of Time slot allocation heuristic
Time slot allocation heuristic
First Phase:
1. Pick a task Ti which has less than κ adjacent tasks in a graph G.
2. Put Ti on the stack and remove it along with the incident edges from
the graph G.
3. Repeat step 1 and 2, until the graph G is non-empty.
Second Phase: In each iteration:
1. Pop the task present at the top of the stack.
2. Assign it the lowest numbered time slot that is not assigned to any of
its neighbouring tasks.
4.1.2 Detailed Time slot allocation heuristic
The first phase of the mechanism is depicted in line 2 − 9 of Algorithm 1. In
each iteration of while loop in line 2 − 9, a task with neighbours less than κ
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJfQQNY7NdU
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(κ time slots are available) is picked-up and is pushed into the stack S. Next,
the recently pushed task is removed from the graph G along with its incident
edges.
Algorithm 1: Time slot allocation heuristic (G, κ)
1 G′ ← G, S ← φ
2 while G 6= φ do
3 foreach Tj ∈ V do
4 if |adj(Tj)| < κ then
5 Push(S, Tj) // Task Tj is pushed into the stack S




10 while S 6= φ do
11 k ← Pop(S) // k holds an element popped-up from stack S
12 G← G ∪ {k}




In the second phase, shown in line 10−14 of Algorithm 1, the actual process
of time slot allocation is carried out. For each iteration of while loop in line
10-14, the top element is popped out of the stack S and held in k. The element
held in k is added back to graph G. Each time a task is added in a graph G the
information about the neighbouring tasks is fetched from G′ graph. Now, the
task added in current iteration is assigned a lowest numbered time slot that is
not assigned to its neighbours using line 13. The while loop terminates once
the stack is empty. Finally, in line 15 a graph G containing the information
about the assigned time slot to each of the task is returned.




T1 E1, E3, E4, E6, E9, E10, E13, E15, E17
E2, E3, E5, E6, E10, E12, E16, E18
E12, E16, E19T3
T4 E1, E3, E4, E6, E7, E9, E10, E19
T5 E6, E7, E9,E10, E11, E14, E15, E19, E20








(c) Time slot allocation
Fig. 2: Detailed illustration of Algorithm 1
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Let the budget associated with the 5 tasks are: B1 = 50$, B2 = 25$,
B3 = 30$, B4 = 60$, and B5 = 15$. For each task, the interested set of IoT
devices is depicted in Fig. 2a. Fig. 2a will be read as, for task T3 the interested
set of quality IoT devices are E12, E16, and E19. Based on the configuration
shown in Fig. 2a, a graph G is formed as shown in Fig. 2b. Note that the tasks
T1 and T3 do not share any common IoT devices so they do not have an edge
between them. The result of which, they can be placed in the same time slot.
In our case the tasks T1 and T3 belong to the same time slot, say time slot
1. Tasks T2, T4, and T5 share a common IoT devices so they have an edge
between them and will be placed in three different time slots. Also, these tasks
have an edge with T1 and T3 so they can not be placed in time slot 1. The
tasks T2, T4, and T5 are placed in time slot 2, time slot 3, and time slot 4
respectively.
4.2 Quality Determination Mechanism
As the quality of the IoT devices are unknown, in this section a mechanism is
proposed for determining the quality of the IoT devices. First, the outline of
the Quality determination mechanism is presented in subsection 4.2.1 and in
subsection 4.2.2 the detailed version of the mechanism is discussed.
4.2.1 Outline of The Quality Determination Mechanism
Quality determination mechanism
Repeat:
1. For each task Ti, assign r IoT devices to r
′ other IoT devices for the
ranking purpose; here r′  r.
2. Select an IoT device that appears at first place in most of the rankings.
Until: Each IoT device is considered for the ranking.
4.2.2 Detailed Quality Determination Mechanism
Algorithm 2: Main routine (G, B, I, τ , T, b)
Output: A, P
1 foreach i ∈ τ do
2 foreach Tj ∈ i do
3 (πj , b̃j) ← Quality determination mechanism (Tj , Ij)
4 (A′j ,P
′
j) ← Allocation and payment rule (πj , b̃j , Bj)
5 A← A ∪ A′j
6 P ← P ∪ P ′j
7 end
8 end
9 return A, P
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The idea behind providing the Main routine is to capture each task of the
system present in different time slots. In main routine, line 1−8 keeps track of
each time slot and in each time slot each task is taken care by line 2− 7. Line
9 returns the allocation and payment vectors for all the tasks in the system.
In Algorithm 3, initializations are done in line 1. In line 2, Ψ ′j and Ψj keeps
the copy of the IoT devices that execute the task Tj . The do while loop in
line 3-14 iterates until all the IoT devices are ranked up. Using line 7-10 the
record about the top ranked IoT device by each Ei ∈ ϕ is kept in the N ′. In
line 11, Φj captures the IoT device that was ranked top by most of the IoT
devices for task Tj . Line 13 removes the IoT devices that are already ranked,
from Ψj . Finally, line 15 returns Φj that contains the quality IoT devices for
task Tj , and b̃j .
Algorithm 3: Quality determination mechanism (Tj , Ij)
Output: Φj ← φ
1 Ψ ← φ, ϕ← φ, N ′ ← φ, β ← φ
2 Ψ ′j = Ψj = I
j
3 do
4 Ψ ← Pick random (Ψj , r) // Pick r IoT devices from Ψj.
5 ϕ ← Pick random (Ψ ′j \ Ψ , r′) // Pick r′ IoT devices from
Ψ ′j \ Ψ.
6 Assign the completed task Tj of each IoT device in Ψ to the IoT
devices in ϕ for ranking purpose.
7 forall the Ei ∈ ϕ do
8 β ← Select best(ji ) // Select top ranked IoT device
from Ei′s ranked list for task Tj given as ji.
9 N ′ ← N ′ ∪ {β} // N ′ allows the duplication of
elements.
10 end
11 Φj ← Φj ∪ { max
Ek∈N ′
{|Sk|}} // Sk is the set of Ek′s in N ′.
12 b̃j ← b̃j ∪ {bjk} // b̃j is the bid vector of quality IoT
devices.
13 Ψj ← Ψj \ Ψ
14 while Ψj 6= φ
15 return Φj , b̃j
Example 2 For the detailed illustration of Algorithm 3 we have considered the
set-up discussed in Example 1. In this example, we have illustrated Algorithm
3 for one task, say task T1. However, similar procedure could be followed for
the remaining tasks. For the 1st iteration of the peer grading (PG) process, we
have randomly selected 3 IoT devices (r = 3) say E3, E9, and E15 and assigned
their executed task to the remaining IoT devices for the reviewing purposes.
Next, following Algorithm 3, we have to check which IoT device among E3,
E9, and E15 has been top ranked by the majority of the peers. From Fig. 3a
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one can see that E3 has been top ranked by the majority of the IoT devices.
So, we have Φ1 = {E3}.
E1: ≻11E3 E9 E15≻11
E4: ≻14E3 E15 E9≻14
E6: ≻16E15 E3 E9≻16
E10: ≻110E9 E15 E3≻110
E13: ≻113E15 E3 E9≻113
E17: ≻117E3 E15 E9≻117
E3
(a) PG (1st iteration)
E3: ≻13E4 E10 E1≻13
E6: ≻16E4 E1 E10≻16
E9: ≻19E1 E4 E10≻19
E13: ≻113E10 E1 E4≻113
E15: ≻115E1 E4 E10≻115
E17: ≻117E4 E1 E10≻117
E4
(b) PG (2nd iteration)
E1: ≻11E6 E13 E17≻11
E3: ≻13E6 E17 E13≻13
E4: ≻14E17 E6 E13≻14
E9: ≻19E13 E17 E6≻19
E10: ≻110E17 E6 E13≻110
E15: ≻115E6 E17 E13≻115
E6
(c) PG (3rd iteration)
Fig. 3: Detailed illustration of Algorithm 3
In the similar fashion, we can continue with the other iterations of the peer
grading process as shown in Fig. 3b and Fig. 3c and determine the quality IoT
devices. At the end of the peer grading process, we get Φ1 = {E3,E4,E6}.
4.3 Allocation and Payment Rule
This section explains the Allocation and payment rule presented in the Algo-
rithm 4.
Algorithm 4: Allocation and payment rule (πj , b̃j , Bj)
Output: Aj , P j
/* Allocation Rule */
1 Sort(πj , b̃j) // Sort π
j based on b̃j as b
j
1 ≤ bj2 ≤ . . . ≤ bjk̃j; such
that k̃j < kj
2 k ← 1
3 while bji ≤
Bj
k do
4 Aj ← Aj ∪ {Ei} // Aj keeps track of winning IoT devices.
5 k ← k + 1
6 end
/* Payment Rule */
7 foreach Ei ∈ Aj do





9 P j ← P j ∪ {P ji}
10 end
11 return Aj , P j
Considering the allocation rule, in line 1 first the quality IoT devices in
πj is sorted in increasing order based on the bid vector b̃j . The variable k
is initialized to 1. The while loop in line 3 − 6 determines the largest index
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k that satisfies the stopping condition of the while loop. Talking about the
payment rule, for each Ei in Aj the minimum among Bjk and b
j
k+1 is taken as
the payment. Finally, line 11 returns the allocation and payment for task Tj .
Example 3 For understanding the allocation and payment rule, let us continue
with the quality IoT devices resulted from Example 2. The budget given for
task T1 is 50$. The quality IoT devices along with their bid values are depicted
in Fig. 4a. Utilizing Algorithm 4 in the set-up shown in Fig. 4a. First the IoT
devices are sorted in increasing order of their bid value as shown in Fig. 4b.
Next, from the sorted ordering, first E4 is picked up and is considered, as the
check 10 ≤ 501 is satisfied for E4. Next, E3 is picked up from the ordering and
is also considered because of the similar reason. Next, E6 is picked up from the

















P 44 = min{502 , 30} = 25




Fig. 4: Detailed illustration of Algorithm 4.
So, we have A1 = {E4,E3} as the winning set. We get the k value as 2
for our example. Next, the payment calculation of E4 and E3 is presented
in Fig. 4c. For E4 we have P 14 = min{ 502 , 30} = 25, and for E3 we have
P 13 = min{ 502 , 30} = 25. In this case, it can be seen that the total payment
made to the IoT devices is equal to budget i.e. 50. For E4 the utility is u14 =
P 14−v14 = 25−10 = 15 and for E3 the utility is u13 = P 13−v13 = 25−20 = 5. It
can be seen that the utility of the IoT devices are non-negative, so the TUBE-
TAP mechanism is individually rational.
In order to see the truthful behaviour of TUBE-TAP, let us suppose that
the IoT device E6 reports its bid value as 15 instead of 30. In such scenario,
the allocation rule of TUBE-TAP mechanism will give A1 = {E4,E6} as the
winning set. For E4 we have the payment as P 14 = min{ 502 , 20} = 20, and
for E6 we have the payment as P 16 = min{ 502 , 20} = 20. For E4 the utility
is u14 = P
1
4 − v14 = 20 − 10 = 10 and for E6 the utility is u16 = P 16 − v16 =
20 − 30 = −10. So, by misreporting its true value the IoT device E6 is not
gaining. Hence, TUBE-TAP is truthful.
5 Analysis of TUBE-TAP
This section presents the analysis of TUBE-TAP.
Proposition 1 The mechanism in Singer (2010) has an approximation ratio
of 2.
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Lemma 1 TUBE-TAP is truthful.
Proof The proof is divided into two cases. In the first case, we have taken an
arbitrary winning IoT device into consideration and discuss the impact on its
gain (or utility), when it deviates from its true valuation. In second case, we
have considered any arbitrary losing IoT device and analysis similar to Case
1 is done. Fix a task Tj .
Case 1 Let us suppose that ith winning IoT device deviates from its true
value and reports a bid value bji < v
j
i . As the IoT device Ei was winning
with vji , it will continue to win with b
j
i because by reporting value lesser than
the true value, it will be appearing early in the ordering. So, its utility will be
ûji = P
j
i−vji which is same as uji . But, if it reports bji > vji , this gives rise to two
possibilities. One possibility could be, it would continue to win by appearing
later in the ordering and in that case its utility will be ûji = P
j
i − vji = uji .
Another possibility could be, it may lose by appearing later in the ordering in
that case its utility will be ûji = 0.
Case 2 Let us suppose that ith losing IoT device deviates from its true value
and reports a bid value bji > v
j
i . As the IoT device Ei was losing with v
j
i , it
will continue to lose by bji because by deviating this way it will be appearing
later in the ordering. So, its gain will be ûji = 0 which is same as u
j
i . But, if
it reports bji < v
j
i , then the two possibilities arises. One possibility could be,
by deviating this way it could appear early in the ordering but still continue
to lose and in that case ûji = 0 which is same as u
j
i . Another possibility could
be, it could win, in that case it has defeated the IoT device Ek with valuation
vjk < v
j




k. In this case, its payment will be less as compared to
its true valuation. So, its utility ûji = P
j
i − vji < 0. Hence, no gain is achieved.
Considering Case 1 and Case 2, it can be concluded that the IoT devices
cannot gain by misreporting their true value. So, TUBE-TAP is truthful.
Lemma 2 In TUBE-TAP, for each task requester Rj the total payment P j
made to the IoT devices are within available budget Bj. More formally, P j =∑
Ei∈Aj









Proof The proof is presented in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 3 The allocation resulted by TUBE-TAP is at most 2 allocation away
from the optimal one i.e. OPT ≤ 2×OM ; where OPT is the optimal allocation
and OM is the allocation resulted by TUBE-TAP.
Proof Fix a task requester Ri and task Ti. Let us suppose for the sake of
contradiction that the OPT consists of k IoT devices i.e. |OPT | = k and OM
consists of less than k2 IoT devices i.e. |OM | < k2 . It implies that, bik
2
> Bik/2 .
Note, however that this is impossible since we assume that bik
2
≤ . . . ≤ bik, and∑k
j= k2
bij ≤ Bi, which implies that bik
2
≤ Bik/2 . Hence a contradiction.
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Lemma 4 Let U be the event given as U = {Ei is considered for task Tj} and
Xij is an indicator random variable defined as X
i
j = I{U}. Then, the expecta-
tion is just the probability of the corresponding event i.e. E[Xij ] = Pr{U}.
Proof The proof is presented in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 5 The expected number of times any arbitrary Ei is considered (or
winning) is given as p ·ki; where ki is the number of tasks for which the ith IoT
device has shown interest and p is the probability with which Ei is considered
for a task. In other words, E[Xi] = p · ki; where Xi is the random variable
measuring the number of times Ei is considered out of ki.
Proof Fix an IoT device Ei, we now wish to compute the expected number
of times the Ei is considered. We capture the total number of times Ei is
considered out of ki by X
i random variable. So, the expected number of times
Ei is considered is given as E[Xi]. Our sample space for Ei IoT device for any
task Tj is S= {Ei is considered for task Tj , Ei not considered for task Tj}.
So, we have Pr{Ei is considered for task Tj}= p and Pr{Ei is not considered
for task Tj} = 1− p.
We define the indicator random variable Xij as X
i




1, if Ei is considered for task Tj
0, Otherwise
(1)
The expected number of times Ei is considered for task Tj is simply the ex-
pected value of our indicator random variable Xij :
E[Xij ] = E[I{Ei is considered for task Tj}]
As always with the indicator random variable, the expectation is just the
probability of the corresponding event (using lemma 4):
E[Xij ] = 1 · Pr{Xij = 1}+ 0 · Pr{Xij = 0} = 1 · p+ 0 · (1− p) = 1 · p = p




Xij . We can compute E[X
i] by taking expectation both side and










From lemma 4 it can be seen that, the expected value of any random variable




Pr{Ei is considered for task Tj} =
ki∑
j=1
p = p · ki
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Hence, the claim survived. It is to be noted that if p = 12 , then the value of
E[Xi] boils down to ki2 . It means that, any arbitrary Ei in expectation will be
considered for half of number of tasks on which it has shown interest.
Lemma 6 For any arbitrary IoT device Ei the expected number of longest
contiguous rejection out of ki tasks after which the IoT device is considered is
given as Θ(logp ki). More formally, we can say E[Y ] = Θ(logp ki); where Y
is a random variable that captures the longest continuous rejection of any IoT
device.
Proof The proof is presented in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 7 In our system, the probability that any arbitrary IoT device Ei is
considered (or wins) for at least one time out of ki is greater than or equal
to 1 − 1
ep·ki
; where ki is the number of tasks for which the i
th IoT device has





; where Xi is the
random variable measuring the number of times Ei IoT device is considered
out of ki.
Proof The proof is presented in Appendix A.4.
6 Modeling in Divisible Setting
In this section, we provide the variant of our proposed model discussed in Sec-
tion 3. Here, it is considered that, a distinct single task that is held by each
task requester are divisible in nature. Other than this, there are some other
constraints that are taken into consideration that helped making the system
more realistic. It is considered that: 1) each task Ti has an estimated time ti
that is required for its completion. The estimated time vector of n available
tasks is given as t = {t1, t2, . . . , tn}; 2) for each IoT device Ej we have a bat-
tery drainage time and is denoted by t̃j . It means that the time by which its
battery power will be drained out completely. For all the m IoT devices, it is
given by the set t̃ = {t̃1, t̃2, . . . , t̃m}; and 3) each task will be executed by the
IoT devices in a collaborative manner.
The underlying solution approach that is utilized is, first, similar to the
model discussed in Section 3 the tasks along with the IoT devices are dis-
tributed in different time slots. Next, in each time slot, for each task Tj , the
peer grading mechanism (discussed in Algorithm 3) is followed. Next, the task
Tj is divided into constant number of heterogeneous sub-tasks say k̂j given as
Tj = {T1j ,T2j , . . . ,T
k̂j
j }, where Tij is the ith sub-task of task Tj . By heterogene-
ity, we mean that the estimated completion time of the sub-tasks may differ
among themselves. The estimated time of any sub-task Tij is given as tij . The
set tj = {t1j , t2j , . . . , t
k̂j
j } represents the estimated time of all the sub-tasks of
task Tj . Now the questions are: a) how the quality IoT devices that were asso-
ciated with a task Tj will be distributed to these k̂j heterogeneous sub-tasks?,
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b) what payment policy is to be followed in such setting? For this purpose,
solution approach discussed in Algorithm 5 is utilized. For each sub-task, the
assigned IoT devices forms a grand coalition and works collaboratively to com-
plete the same. For the time being, it is assumed that for each sub-task we
have limited (or constant) number of IoT devices and these IoT devices in
coalition are capable of performing the sub-task successfully in the collabora-
tive fashion. In our discussed set-up, the collaborative work culture is achieved
as: each sub-task is divided into independent chunks and each chunk is given
to the IoT device for the execution purpose. In order to do the division of
sub-task among the members of the coalition, we have utilized the Shapley
value concept. The underlying ideas behind utilizing the Shapley value con-
cept for this purpose are: 1) the fair division of a sub-task could be achieved
among the members of the grand coalition, and 2) it satisfies several useful
properties such as symmetry, null player property, and additivity (defined in
subsection 6.1) that is needed for the real time implementation of the system
in true sense. After the execution, the result of each chunk is submitted and
combined together to get the result of the sub-task. Now, using Shapley value
concept, we distribute the available budget for the sub-task under considera-
tion fairly among the available IoT devices in the coalition as their payment.
The result of each sub-task is combined to get the final executed task. It is to
be noted that, we have assumed that no IoT device is capable of completing
a sub-task alone. In this set-up, one scenario that is deliberately overlooked
is, instead of having the substantial number of IoT devices, the sub-tasks may
have huge number of such devices those works collaboratively to accomplish
the sub-task. This deliberation is due to the reason that, in literature it is
pointed out that calculating the Shapley value for such huge set of IoT devices
in a coalition while preserving its properties is NP-hard3. In the upcoming sec-
tion (Section 7), we have relaxed this constraint and provided a non-truthful
budget feasible mechanism to the enhanced version of the problem that utilizes
the concept of proportional share mechanism.
It is to be noted that, due to involvement of IoT devices in a collaborative
work culture, we have modelled the problem under investigation by utilizing
the concept of coalitional game theory (CGT) Maschler et al. (2013). Defining
a coalitional game for a sub-task of task under consideration. Let the set of IoT
devices associated with the sub-task under consideration is given asN . A coali-
tional game is a pair (N , v) where; v : 2N 7−→ R associates with each coalition
F ⊆ N a real-valued pay-off v(F) that the coalition’s members (IoT devices)
can distribute among themselves. We assume that v(φ) = 0. Given a coali-
tional game (N , v), a single-valued solution concept ∇ : N × R2|N| 7−→ R|N |
is a function mapping a coalitional game (that is, a set of IoT devices N and
a value function v) to a vector of |N | real values, and let ∇i(N , v) denote the
ith such real value (value of ith IoT device in (N , v) according to ∇).
Given the above discussed set-up, our objective is to select a subset of IoT
3 It could be tackled by utilizing the concept of Approximate Shapley value Fatima et al.
(2008) that is reserved for our future work.
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devices for each task in such a way that the required estimated time for each
task could be attained by the remaining battery power of the IoT devices,
working collaboratively. Along with this, it should also be ensured that the
total payment made to the selected IoT devices for each task is within the
allotted quota of budget while attaining a threshold quality. In this paper, for
this set-up we have designed a non-truthful budget feasible mechanism (No-
TUBE) motivated by Maschler et al. (2013); Shapley (1953) that allow us to
attain the objective that we are interested in.
Definition 4 Given a coalitional game (N , v), the Shapley value of ith IoT
device is given by





|F|!(|N | − |F| − 1)!
[





v(F ∪ {i}) − v(F)
]
is the marginal contribution of ith IoT
device when added to any coalition F that does not contain i.
6.1 Several Useful Properties
In this section, we discuss the properties satisfied by the Shapley value Maschler
et al. (2013); Shapley (1953):
Definition 5 (Symmetry) Let (N , v) be a coalitional game, and let Ni, Nj
∈ N . Then, we can say the IoT devices Ni and Nj are symmetric if for every
coalition F ⊆ N \ {Ni, Nj} they always contribute the same amount. More
formally,
v(F ∪ {Ni}) = v(F ∪ {Nj}) (3)
A solution concept ∇ satisfies symmetry if for every coalitional game
(N , v) and every pair of symmetric IoT devices Ni and Nj in the game,
we have:
∇i(N , v) =∇j(N , v) (4)
Definition 6 (Dummy IoT device) An IoT device Ni is called a dummy
IoT device in a coalitional game (N , v), if for every coalition F ⊆ N , including
the empty coalition, the value that Ni contributes is 0. More formally,
v(F) = v(F ∪ {Ni}) (5)
For any v, if Ni is a dummy IoT device in a coalitional game (N , v)
then ∇i is given as:
∇i(N , v) = 0 (6)
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Definition 7 (Additivity) For the the game (N , vi + vj) with (N , vi) and
(N , v2) are the two separate coalitional game, then for every coalition F ⊆ N
we can have,
(vi + vj)(F) = vi(F) + vj(F) (7)
A solution concept ∇i for each Ni satisfies the additivity property if
for every pair of coalitional game (N , vi) and (N , vj);
∇i(N , vi + vj) =∇i(N , vi) +∇i(N , vj) (8)
6.2 Proposed Mechanism: NoTUBE
In this section, we propose a non-truthful budget feasible mechanism (No-
TUBE) for our setting. First, the outline of the NoTUBE is given in sub
section 6.3. The detailing of the NoTUBE is illustrated in sub section 6.4.
6.3 Outline of NoTUBE
In this section, the outline of NoTUBE is presented.
NoTUBE
1. Follow Algorithm 1 and 3 for distributing the tasks into different time
slots and for determining the quality IoT devices respectively.
2. For each task, sort the quality IoT devices in decreasing order of their
battery power left.
3. In each time slot, divide each task into constant number of heteroge-
neous sub-tasks.
4. From the sorted ordering, assign an IoT device to the sub-task having
the highest remaining estimated time until each sub-task has substan-
tial number of IoT devices.
5. For each sub-task, utilize the Shapley value concept for distributing
the part of sub-task and the part of budget as payment among the
member of the coalition in a fair way.
6.4 Detailing of NoTUBE
This section explains the detailing of the NoTUBE presented in Algorithm 5.
For each iteration of for loop in line 1-28, a time slot is considered. In each time
slot the available tasks are taken care by line 2-27. Line 3 sorts the quality IoT
devices associated with task Tj in decreasing order of battery drainage time.
After that, the task Tj is divided into heterogeneous sub-tasks as stated in line
4. Line 5-13 depicts the coalition formation procedure for all the sub-tasks of a
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task under consideration. Line 6 selects an IoT device from the sorted ordering
and held in `∗. In line 7, the sub-task with highest remaining estimated time
is selected and stored in q∗.
Algorithm 5: NoTUBE (T, B, t̃, t, τ)
Output: T ← φ, A← φ, P ← φ
1 foreach i ∈ τ do
2 foreach Tj ∈ i do
3 L ← Sort(πj) // πj is the set of quality IoT devices
for Tj.
4 Divide the task Tj into k̂j sub-tasks i.e. Tj = {T1j ,T2j , . . . ,T
k̂j
j }
5 while tij > k
∗ for any Tij ∈ Tj do
6 `∗ ← Select (L)
7 q∗ ← argmaxTij∈Tj{t
j}
8 Assign(q∗, `∗) // assigns the IoT device in `∗ to
the sub-task in q∗.
9 N ij ← N ij ∪ {`∗}
10 tij = t
i
j - t̃∗ // t̃∗ is the battery drainage time of
IoT device in `∗.
11 Update(tj) // update the estimated time vector of
Tj
12 L ← L \ {`∗}
13 end
14 foreach Tij ∈ Tj do
15 foreach E` ∈ N ij do









17 T j` ← T
j
` ∪ {∇′`(N ij , v)}
18 P j` ← P
j
` ∪ {∇`(N ij , v)}
19 end
20 Tj ← Tj ∪ T j`
21 Aj ← πj
22 P j ← P j ∪ P j`
23 end
24 T ← T ∪ Tj
25 A ← A ∪ Aj
26 P ← P ∪ P j
27 end
28 end
29 return T , A, P
N ij maintains the set of IoT devices allocated to Tij using line 9. In line
10, t̃∗ is subtracted from the estimated time of the sub-task Tij . The while
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loop terminates only when, for all the sub-tasks the remaining estimated time
is greater than some small negative constant k∗. By taking k∗ this way (say
for example k∗ = -5), we guarantee that each of the sub-task will be having
a substantial number of IoT devices. Once the coalition for each sub-task is
determined, next objective is to have a fair division of each sub-task as chunks
and the budget as payment among the members of the coalition. Utilizing,
line 14-23 the required objective is achieved. In line 17, T j` is the estimated
time of chunk of the sub-task Tij allotted to E`. P
j
` is the payment of IoT
device associated with task Tj calculated in line 18. In line 24, T keeps track
of amount of time IoT devices in A execute the allocated task. The allocation
vector and payment vector of all the winning IoT devices are held in A and P
respectively as depicted in line 25 and 26. Line 29 returns the outputs.
6.5 Illustrative Example
In this section, we provide the working example for showing the Shapley value
calculation in action in Algorithm 5. Consider a task Tr as the translation of a
book ”Introduction to Algorithms” by Cormen et al. written in English into 5
different languages (such as French, Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, and German).
The translation process is carried out in the Lab of an Institute equipped with
say 20 quality IoT devices given as E1,E2, . . . ,E20. These IoT devices are pro-
grammed in a way that they are capable of translating any given language to
other languages. The estimated completion time of the task Tr is given as 15
hrs. In our running example, translating a book written in English language
to some other language is considered as a sub-task. It means that, translating
a book ”Introduction to Algorithms” by Cormen et al. written in English to
say French is considered as a sub-task and is represented as T1r in our case.
In the similar fashion, from English to Spanish as T2r, English to Chinese as
T3r, English to Japanese as T4r, and English to German as T5r. The estimated
completion time of the sub-tasks T1r, T2r, T3r, T4r, and T5r are 5hrs, 4hrs, 3hrs,
2hrs, and 1hr respectively. The total budget associated with the task Tr is
120$. The total budget associated with task Tr will be distributed among the
sub-tasks in the proportion of their estimated completion time. It means that,
the total budget of 120$ associated with the task Tr will be distributed among
the sub-tasks T1r, T2r, T3r, T4r, and T5r in the ratio 5:4:3:2:1. So, the budget
associated with the sub-tasks T1r, T2r, T3r, T4r, and T5r is 40$, 32$, 24$, 16$,
and 8$ respectively. Now, let us consider a sub-task T2r (i.e. translating a book
”Introduction to Algorithms” by Cormen et al. written in English to Spanish)
to show the Shapley value calculation. Let the IoT devices that are assigned to
the sub-task T2r be E2, E3, E15, and E7. The battery drainage time for these
IoT devices is given as: t̃2 = 2hrs, t̃3 = 1hr, t̃15 = 1hr, and t̃7 = 1hr. By
forming the grand coalition, the allocated IoT devices are required to achieve
the estimated time of 4hrs for task T2r. Now, in the grand coalition, the frac-
tion of sub-task T2r and the fraction of budget associated with T2r given to
the IoT devices E2, E3, E15, and E7 are calculated as: (Here, ξ′ik and ξik rep-
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resents the ith term in the Shapley value calculation for the fair distribution
of the sub-task and the budget to the kth member of the coalition respectively.)







0!× (4− 0− 1)!
4!
× [v({E2})−v(φ)] =
0!× (4− 0− 1)!
4!
× [0−0] = 0
− Case 2: (When coalition F2r contains 1 member i.e. |F2r| = 1 and then E2






1!× (4− 1− 1)!
4!
×[v(X)−v(Y )] = 3×1!× (4− 1− 1)!
4!
×[0−0] = 0
Here, X = {E2, E3} = {E2, E15} = {E2, E7}; Y = E3 = E15 = E7.
− Case 3: (When coalition F2r contains 2 members i.e. |F2r| = 2 and then E2




2!× (4− 2− 1)!
4!






2!× (4− 2− 1)!
4!





Here, X ′ = {E2, E3, E7} = {E2, E3, E15} = {E2, E7, E15}; Y ′ = {E3, E7} =
{E3, E15} = {E7, E15}.
− Case 4: (When coalition F2r contains 3 members i.e. |F2r| = 3 and then E2




3!× (4− 3− 1)!
4!






3!× (4− 3− 1)!
4!





Here, X ′′ = {E2, E3, E7, E15}; Y ′′ = {E3, E7, E15}.
Combining Case 1, Case 2, Case 3, and Case 4; we get






2 = 0hr + 0hr + 1hr + 1hr = 2hrs










The value ∇′2(N , v)=2hrs indicate that the IoT device E2 will be allocated a
chunk of sub-task with estimated time of 2hrs. On the other hand, the value
∇2(N , v)=16$ represents the payment received by E2 for executing the chunk
of sub-task for 2hrs.
In the grand coalition, the fraction of sub-task and the budget given to E3 is
calculated as: (by symmetry for E7, and E15) is given by:
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0!× (4− 0− 1)!
4!
× [v({E3})−v(φ)] =
0!× (4− 0− 1)!
4!
× [0−0] = 0
− Case 2: (When coalition F2r contains 1 member i.e. |F2r| = 1 and then E3






1!× (4− 1− 1)!
4!
×[v(X)−v(Y )] = 3×1!× (4− 1− 1)!
4!
×[0−0] = 0
Here, X = {E2, E3} = {E3, E15} = {E3, E7}; Y = E2 = E15 = E7.
− Case 3: (When coalition F2r contains 2 members i.e. |F2r| = 2 and then E3




2!× (4− 2− 1)!
4!





2!× (4− 2− 1)!
4!




Here, X ′ = {E2, E3, E7} = {E2, E3, E15} = {E3, E7, E15}; Y ′ = {E2, E7} =
{E2, E15} = {E7, E15}.
− Case 4: (When coalition F2r contains 3 members i.e. |F2r| = 3 and then E3




3!× (4− 3− 1)!
4!




3!× (4− 3− 1)!
4!
×[v(X ′′)−v(Y ′′)] = 1×3!× (4− 3− 1)!
4!
×[32−32] = 0
Here, X ′′ = {E2, E3, E7, E15}; Y ′′ = {E2, E7, E15}.
Combining Case 1, Case 2, Case 3, and Case 4; we get






3 = 0hr + 0hr +
4
6




∇3(N , v) = ξ13 + ξ23 + ξ33 + ξ43 = 0$ + 0$ +
32
6




So, we have∇′2(N , v) = 2hrs,∇2(N , v) = 16$;∇′3(N , v) = 0.66hr,∇3(N , v) =
5.33$; ∇′7(N , v) = 0.66hr, ∇7(N , v) = 5.33$; and ∇′15(N , v) = 0.66hr,
∇15(N , v) = 5.33$.
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6.6 Analysis of NoTUBE
Lemma 8 In NoTUBE, for each task Tk the total payment made to the IoT
devices is equal to budget Bk.
Proof Fix a task requester Tk having budget Bk. Now, each sub-task is allotted
the part of total budget reserved for a task Tk. Considering any sub-task, from
the construction of NoTUBE, it can be seen that the payment made to the
IoT devices is some fractional part of the budget. As, we are interested in
determining that fractional value which can be determined using equation 2.
When it comes to the allocation of chunks or the budget both these entities
is distributed in same proportion to the IoT devices. In the more clear sense,
the ratio in which the sub-task is assigned to the IoT devices in terms of the
total estimated time using equation 2, in the same ratio the available budget
is also distributed among them.
In this collaborative environment, as summing over the estimated time of
the chunks allocated to each IoT device will lead to achieve the total estimated
time of the sub-task, so as the case with the payment and budget. So, if this
argument is true for any sub-task of the task then we can argue that it will
be true for the remaining heterogeneous sub-tasks. Hence, summing over all
the sub-tasks, the total payment made to the IoT devices associated to the
task Tk will be equal to the allotted quota of budget Bk. Hence, NoTUBE is
budget feasible.
Lemma 9 In our system, for any arbitrary sub-task that has the highest esti-
mated time, the number of IoT devices assigned continuously to that sub-task
so that the switch happens, is constant. If the probability of assigning IoT de-
vice to the sub-task Tij of the task Tj be p, then E[X] = 1p ; where X is the
random variable capturing the event.
Proof The proof is presented in Appendix B.1.
Corollary 1 The above lemma (Lemma 9) claims that NoTUBE will lead to
the balanced distribution of IoT devices associated to some task Tj among the
heterogeneous sub-tasks.
Theorem 1 (Negative Result) NoTUBE is non-truthful.
Proof The proof is presented in Appendix B.2.
7 Further Enhancement of The Model
In this section, we have enhanced the model discussed in section 6 by relaxing
just the constraint that each sub-task should have constant or substantial
number of IoT devices associated with them. It means that, now the sub-tasks
will have large number of IoT devices forming the larger coalition, so as to
finish the sub-task in a collaborative fashion. By large coalition we mean that,
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the fair division of an itinerary among the members of the grand coalition using
Shapley value is intractable or hard. Also, relaxing this constraint may give rise
to the inclusion of those IoT devices in the coalition which are having very
minimal battery power left for the execution purpose. It is to be noted that
these minimal battery powered IoT devices were ignored in our previous set-up
presented in section 6. As for this set-up the Shapley value calculation for the
members of the coalitions while preserving several useful properties is NP-hard.
We propose a non-truthful budget feasible mechanism for the enhanced version
of the task assignment problem called non-truthful budget feasible mechanism
for enhanced task assignment problem (NoTUBE-ETAP).
7.1 Proposed Mechanism: NoTUBE-ETAP
This section explains the detailing of the NoTUBE-ETAP presented in Algo-
rithm 6.
Algorithm 6: NoTUBE-ETAP (T, B, t̃, t, τ)
Output: T ← φ, A← φ, P ← φ
1 foreach i ∈ τ do
2 foreach Tj ∈ i do
3 Follow line 3-4 of Algorithm 5
4 while L 6= φ do
5 Follow line 6-12 of Algorithm 5
6 end
7 foreach Tij ∈ Tj do
8 foreach E` ∈ N ij do














// Bij is the budget
associated with subtask Tij.
11 end
12 Tj ← T j ∪ T j`
13 Aj ← πj
14 P j ← P j ∪ P j`
15 end
16 T ← T ∪ Tj
17 A ← A ∪ Aj
18 P ← P ∪ P j
19 end
20 end
21 return T , A, P
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For each iteration of for loop in line 1-20, a time slot is considered and in
each time slot the available tasks are taken care by line 2-19. The stopping
condition in the while loop in line 4 ensures that the loop terminates only
when all the IoT devices are allocated to the sub-task. Once the coalition for
each sub-task is determined, next objective is to have a fair division of each
sub-task as chunks and the budget as payment among the members of the
coalition. Utilizing line 7-15 the required objective is achieved. In line 16, T
keeps track of amount of time IoT devices in A executes the allocated task.
The allocation vector and payment vector of all the winning IoT devices is held
in A and P respectively as depicted in line 17 and 18 respectively. Finally, line
21 returns the required outputs.
Theorem 2 (Negative Result) NoTUBE-ETAP is non-truthful.
Proof The proof follow the similar argument provided in Theorem 1.
8 Experimental Findings
In this section, we measure the efficacy of our proposed mechanism called
TUBE-TAP via simulation. TUBE-TAP is compared with the carefully crafted
benchmark mechanism that is non-truthful in nature. The manipulative be-
haviour of the IoT devices in case of benchmark mechanism can be seen evi-
dently in the simulation results. It is to be noted that, our benchmark mecha-
nism differs in terms of allocation and payment policies from the TUBE-TAP.
In the benchmark mechanism, for each task Tj , firstly the quality IoT de-
vices are sorted in increasing order of their bid value. Next, in each iteration
an IoT device i is picked up and a check is made whether bji+1 + ε is less than
or equal to the remaining budget associated with the task Tj or not, where
bji+1 is the bid value of the (i + 1)
th IoT device followed by i in the sorted
ordering. If the stopping condition for the ith IoT device is satisfied, then it
will be declared as winner and its payment is given as P ji = b
j
i+1 + ε. Before
moving to the next iteration the paid amount is deducted from the available
budget. The process terminates once the stopping condition is dissatisfied.
It is to be noted that, the ε value is taken as 10 for the simulation purpose.
The unit of bid value and the budget is taken as $. The experiments are carried
out using Python.
8.1 Simulation Set-up
Table 1 shows the data set utilized for the simulation purpose. In our case,
the experiment runs for 50 rounds and the required values are plotted by
taking average over these 50 rounds. Other than this, in order to strengthen
our claim, we have simulated the mechanisms for two different probability
distributions independently; namely, uniform distribution (UD) and normal
distribution (ND). Throughout the experiment, the bid value range (in case of
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UD) for IoT devices and the budget range for the tasks are kept fixed. It is to
be noted that, the budget is uniformly distributed within the given range for
both ND and UD cases. Considering the case of ND, for generating the bid
values of the IoT devices the mean is taken as 110 and standard deviation is
taken as 15.
Table 1: Data set utilized for simulation purpose
Task requesters 50 100 150 200 250 300
Task executers 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
Bid value range (for UD) [80, 150] [80, 150] [80, 150] [80, 150] [80, 150] [80, 150]
Budget distribution [400, 600] [400, 600] [400, 600] [400, 600] [400, 600] [400, 600]
In order to measure the efficacy of TUBE-TAP, we have taken two performance
metrics: 1) Budget utilization, and 2) Utility of the IoT devices.
8.2 Result Analysis
In this section, we are simulating TUBE-TAP which we are claiming is budget
feasible and truthful in our setting against the benchmark mechanism (which
will be referred as BM in the figures of simulation results)4. We can see in
Fig. 5a, and Fig. 5b that the budget utilization in case of TUBE-TAP is a bit
more as compared to the budget utilization in case of BM for both ND and
UD cases. This is due to the fact that, in TUBE-TAP each winner is paid a
value between the bid value of last winner and the bid value of the first loser
present in the sorted ordering. However, in BM each winner is paid a bit more






















































(b) Budget utilization (UD)
Fig. 5: Comparison of Budget utilization in ND and UD cases
4 Similarly, the other two mechanisms; NoTUBE and TUBE-ETAP could be simulated
and analyzed.
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As the bid values of the IoT devices are sorted in increasing order, so the
payment made to each winning IoT device in case of TUBE-TAP is more
as compared to BM. Another important observation one can make from Fig.
5a, and Fig. 5b is that, both the mechanisms i.e. TUBE-TAP and BM are
budget feasible that supports the claim made for TUBE-TAP in Lemma 2. Next
comes the discussion on the behaviour of the mechanisms based on our second
parameter. The sole purpose of considering this parameter is to judge the two
mechanisms on the ground of truthfulness. During the simulation, in order to
show the so called manipulative behaviour of BM we have varied the bid values
of the subset of the IoT devices. More formally, we have considered that 15%
of the available IoT devices (in our case this is referred as small variation)
are increasing their bid value by 35% of their true valuation. Similar is the
case with medium variation (30% of the available IoT devices are increasing
their bid value by 35% of their true valuation) and the large variation (40%
of the available IoT devices are increasing their bid value by 35% of their true
valuation). In the figures of simulation results, BM with small variation, BM
with medium variation, and BM with large variation is shown as BM-S-var,
BM-M-var, and BM-L-var respectively. From Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b it can be
seen that, most of the time the utility of IoT devices for TUBE-TAP is more






























































(b) Utility of IoT devices (UD)
Fig. 6: Comparison of Utility of IoT devices in ND and UD cases
This very nature of TUBE-TAP is due to the reason that IoT devices are
paid higher in case of TUBE-TAP as compared to BM that can be concluded
from the results shown Fig. 5a, and Fig. 5b. Also, talking about the manip-
ulative nature of the BM, it can be easily seen in Fig. 6a, and Fig. 6b that
overall utility of the IoT devices gets increased by misreporting the bid values.
The utility of IoT devices is higher in case of large variation than in case of
medium variation than in case of small variation. Also, in some manipulative
cases (mostly in large variation) it could be seen that the utility achieved by
the IoT devices in case of BM bypass even the utility gained by the IoT devices
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in case of TUBE-TAP. So, one can conclude that larger the number of IoT
devices increasing their bid value by some amount (say 35%) higher will be
the utility for the IoT devices. As the IoT devices are gaining by misreporting,
so BM is non-truthful.
9 Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we have investigated a heterogeneous task assignment problem
in IoT based crowdsourcing through the lens of mechanism design. We have
designed a truthful mechanism for the problem such that for each task the total
payment made to the subset of IoT devices are within budget while achieving
a threshold quality. Furthermore, we have considered the more realistic version
of the problem by injecting the constraint that the tasks endowed with the
task requesters are divisible in nature along with the several other additional
constraints. We have proposed the non-truthful budget feasible mechanisms for
the more realistic versions of the problem.
In our future works, we can think of designing a truthful budget feasible
mechanism for the more realistic version of the problem. In addition to this, we
can also think of designing a truthful mechanism for the set-up with multiple
task requesters and multiple IoT devices, where each task requester is carrying
multiple heterogeneous tasks, instead of, a single task.
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Appendix
A Omitted Proofs from Section 5
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Fix a task requester Rj and a task Tj . From the construction of TUBE-TAP,
it is clear that, the maximum payment that any winning IoT device will be
paid is
Bj
k ; where k is the largest index obtained in the ordering of IoT devices
that satisfies bjk ≤
Bj












× k = Bj
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From here we can say that, P j ≤ Bj . As this is true for any task Tj , so







Bj . This completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
By the definition of indicator random variable, we can write Xij is 1 when U
occurs and 0 when U does not occurs. So, as Xij = I{U}. Taking expectation
both side, we get from definition of expectation
E[Xij ] = E[I{U}] = Pr{U}
The detailing of this lemma is provided in draft version Singh et al. (2018a).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 6
Fix an IoT device Ei. In similar line the proof is illustrated in Cormen et al.
(2009). Our proof is divided into two cases. From Lemma 5 it can be seen that
the probability that Ei will be considered for any task Tj is p. LetXikl = I{Aikl}
be the indicator random variable associated with an event that the IoT device
Ei is rejected for at least l tasks starting form kth task. It is to be noted
that, the participation in one time slot by the IoT device is independent of the
participation in other time slots. So, for any given event Xikl, the probability
that for all l tasks the IoT device is rejected is given as
Pr{Aikl} = p · p · · · l times = pl (9)
As in our case, k varies from 1 to ki − l + 1 (i.e. 1 ≤ k ≤ ki − l + 1), so the





Taking expectation both side, we get
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E[Y ] = (ki − l + 1) · pl
Now, for l = c logp ki and for some positive constant c, we obtain
E[Y ] = (ki − c logp ki + 1) · pc logp ki
= (ki − c logp ki + 1) · kci
= kc+1i − ckci logp ki + kci
= Θ(kci )
From here we can conclude that, for some constant c ≥ 1 the longest continuous
rejection boils down to Θ(logp ki). Hence, the claim survived.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 7
Fix an IoT device Ei. As Ei has shown interest on ki tasks that are present
in different time slots. The probability that Ei will be considered for task Tj
is p (Pr{Ei is not considered for task Tj} = 1− p). Also, it can be seen that,
the consideration of Ei in any time slot is independent of other time slots. So,
the probability that Ei will not be considered at all for any of the ki tasks is
given as:
Pr[Xi < 1] = (1− p) · (1− p) . . . ki times
= (1− p)ki
Following the inequality 1 + x ≤ ex, we get
Pr[Xi < 1] ≤ e−p·ki = 1
ep·ki
Now, the probability that any Ei will be considered at least once is given as





Hence, the claim survives. Also, for p = ln 2, we can see that











It can be concluded that, the term 12ki represents that any arbitrary Ei will
not be considered at all is very small, and can say that it is very unlikely to
occur. So, the term (1 − 12ki ) will be quite large and hence can say that any
IoT device could be considered for at least once with larger probability.
B Omitted Proofs from Subsection 6.6
B.1 Proof of Lemma 9
At any ith iteration of the Algorithm 5, say a sub-task Tij of task Tj is having
the highest estimated time among the other sub-tasks. From the construction
of NoTUBE, the sub-task Tij is a potential candidate for getting the IoT de-
vice(s). It is quite clear from Algorithm 5 that, with each assignment of IoT
device to the sub-task Tij , an estimated time of the sub-task under consider-
ation goes down monotonically. Once the substantial number of IoT devices
is allocated to sub-task Tji , a new sub-task comes up as a potential candidate
for getting the IoT devices, we call this as switch. So, in this lemma we are
trying to answer the query: what is the substantial number of IoT devices in
expectation that is to be assigned to any sub-task with highest estimated time
before the switch happens?
Let us suppose the assignment of substantial number of IoT devices to a
sub-task as a Bernoulli trials. So, we have a sequence of Bernoulli trials, each
with probability of assigning IoT device to the sub-task Tij be p and the prob-
ability of not assigning the IoT device to the sub-task Tij is q = 1−p. It can be
observed that, the switch can occur after 1st assignment, or 2nd assignment,
or 3rd assignment and so on. Making this argument more explicit, we let Xi
be the random variable associated with an event in which the switch occurs
after ith assignment: Xi = I{switch occurs after ith assignment}. Let X be the
random variable denoting the total number of assignment before the switch
happens. So, X has values in the range {1, 2, 3, . . .} and for x ≥ 1,
Pr{X = x} = (1− p) · (1− p) · . . . · (1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x-1 times
· p (10)
since we have x − 1 number of IoT device(s) assigned to any sub-task before
the switch occurs. It can be seen that, the probability distribution in equation
10 is said to be geometric distribution. Now, the expected value of random










x · (1− p)x
















Now, if we have value of p as 12 then we get E[X] = 2, which is a small
constant. Similarly, for p = 13 we have E[X] = 3. Hence the claim survives.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Fix a task Tj . For any arbitrary sub-task, it may happen that the subset
of the IoT devices that are the member of the grand coalition can form the
sub-coalition (coalition other than the grand coalition) and could achieve the
estimated completion time of the sub-task. The result of which, two things
could be observed: (i) the IoT devices in the sub-coalition will have to utilize
more of their battery power as they will be getting larger part of the sub-task
this time as compared to the part they were getting in the grand coalition
but within their battery power drainage time; (ii) the IoT devices in the sub-
coalition is guaranteed to be paid more than they were in the grand coalition.
The benefit raised in point (ii) from IoT device point of view will motivate
the IoT devices to form the sub-coalition and gain. Hence, the IoT devices are
gaining by manipulating the system. So, NoTUBE is not truthful.
